By Uri Avnery, 21.1.06
IT
WAS a colorful day in Bil'in. Political flags of many
colors were fluttering in the brisk breeze, the vivid election posters and the
colorful graffiti on the walls adding their bit. It was the biggest
demonstration in the beleaguered village for a long time. This week, the
protest against the Fence was interwoven with Palestinian electioneering.
I
was happily marching along in the wintry sunshine, holding high the Gush Shalom
emblem of the flags of Israel and Palestine side by side. We were approaching
the line of armed soldiers that was waiting for us, when I suddenly realized
that I was surrounded by the green flags of Hamas.
Ordinary
Israelis would have been flabbergasted. What, the murderous terrorists marching
in line with Israeli peace activists? Israelis marching, talking and joking
with the potential suicide bombers? Impossible!
But
it was quite natural. All the Palestinian parties took part in the
demonstration, together with the Israeli and international activists. Together
they ran away from the clouds of tear gas, broke together through the lines of
soldiers, were beaten up together. The green flags of Hamas, the yellow of
Fatah, the red of the Democratic Front and the blue-and-white of the Israeli
flag on our emblems harmonized, as did the people who carried them.
In
the end, many of us improvised a kind of protest concert. Standing along the
iron security railing, Israelis and Palestinians together, we beat on it
rhythmically with stones, producing something like an African tom-tom that
could be heard for miles around. The Orthodox settlers in nearby Modiin-Illit
must have wondered what it meant.
THE
PARTICIPATION of all Palestinian parties was in itself an
important phenomenon. It was no doubt encouraged by the Palestinian elections,
due to take place this coming Wednesday. It was curious to see the same faces
on the posters along our route and right next to us in the crowd.
But
it also showed the importance the Fence has assumed in Palestinian eyes.
Years
ago, when the construction of the Wall-cum-Fence was just beginning, I went to
see Yasser Arafat to suggest a joint struggle against it. I got the impression
that the idea that the Wall was a serious danger was quite new to him - the
Palestinian establishment had not yet grasped the significance of it. Now it is
near the top of the national agenda.
This
week, on the eve of the elections in which Hamas is expected to gain a
significant share of the vote, the picture of Hamas activists marching side by
side with Israeli peace activists, was important. Because soon Hamas will enter
the Palestinian Parliament and, perhaps, the government, too.
CONDOLEEZZA
RICE sharply criticized the elections because of the
participation of "terrorists", echoing the statement of her new
Israeli colleague, Tsipi Livni, who declared that they are not "democratic
elections" because of Hamas.
What
is emerging now is a new pretext for our government to avoid negotiating with
the elected Palestinian leadership. The pretext changes frequently, but the
purpose remains the same.
First
there was the assertion that Israel would not negotiate until the new
Palestinian president, Mahmoud Abbas, dismantles the "terrorist
infrastructure". That was, indeed, an obligation under the Road Map - but
so was the obligation, completely ignored by Ariel Sharon, simultaneously to
remove the hundred settlements or so that were set up after his coming to
power.
Then
came the claim that the Palestinian Authority was in a state of anarchy. How
can one negotiate with anarchy?
Now
there comes the contention that Israel cannot possibly be expected to negotiate
with a Palestinian leadership that includes Hamas, an organization that has
carried out many suicide bombings and, at least officially, does not accept the
existence of Israel..
The
pretexts are manifold, and more can be produced if necessary. (Reminding me of
my late friend, Natan Yellin-Mor, former leader of the "Stern Gang"
terrorist underground and later peace activist, who said: "I wish God
would put in my way as many temptations as I have pretexts for
succumbing.")
Hamas'
presence in the next Palestinian government is not a reason to reject peace
negotiations. On the contrary, it is a compelling reason for starting them at
long last. It would mean that we negotiate with the entire Palestinian spectrum
(excluding only the small Islamic Jihad
organization). If Hamas joins the government on the basis of Mahmoud
Abbas' peace policy, it is manifestly ripe for negotiations, with or without
arms, based on a hudnah (truce).
Thirty
years ago, when I started secret contacts with the PLO leadership, I was almost
the only person in Israel in favor of negotiating with the organization that
was at the time officially designated as "terrorist". It took almost
20 years for the Israeli government to come round to my point of view. Now we
are starting again from the same point.
Why
do the Palestinian organizations refuse to give up their arms? Let's not
deceive ourselves: for most Palestinians, these arms are a kind of strategic
reserve. If negotiations with Israel lead nowhere, the armed struggle will
probably be resumed. That by itself is not unheard of. (See: Ireland.)
EVEN
IF Mahmoud Abbas wanted to disarm Hamas, he would be
unable to. His weak position, combined with the weakness of his Fatah movement
makes such a measure impossible.
This
weakness, which also finds its expression in the Fawda ("anarchy"),
derives mainly from one source: the sly efforts of Sharon to undermine his
position.
I
have pointed this out more than once: for Sharon, the rise of Abbas constituted
a serious danger. Being favored by President Bush as an example of his success
in bringing democracy and peace to the Middle East, he threatened the exclusive
relationship between the US and Israel, perhaps even opening the way for
American pressure on Israel.
To
prevent this, Sharon denied Abbas even the slightest political concession, such
as releasing prisoners (Marwan Barghouti springs to mind), changing the path of
the Wall, freezing settlement, coordinating the withdrawal from Gaza with
Abbas, etc. This campaign was successful. The authority of Abbas has been
significantly weakened.
Now
Sharon's successors are using this very weakness as a pretext to reject serious
negotiations with him and the next Palestinian government, calling to mind the
story of the boy who, having killed both his parents, threw himself upon the
mercy of the court: "Have pity on a poor orphan!"